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FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF 
SINGAPORE, 1963–2013 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee † 
Abstract: This article surveys the use of foreign precedents in constitutional 
adjudication by the Supreme Court of Singapore for over half of a century during the 
terms of the first three Chief Justices—Wee Chong Jin (1963–1990), Yong Pung How 
(1990–2006), and Chan Sek Keong (2006–2012)—and the first year in office of the 
fourth Chief Justice, Sundaresh Menon (2012–2013).  It concludes that while judges have 
always cited foreign case law, they have only actually applied foreign cases where the 
wording of the Constitution and the constitutional arrangements in Singapore are fairly 
analogous to the constitutional texts and arrangements upon which the cases were 
decided.  Sometimes, Singapore judges quoted passages from cases in an instrumental 
manner to support statements of law without necessarily analyzing in detail the reasoning 
underlying such cases.  There were also instances where foreign jurisprudence was 
rejected on the basis that it related to constitutional texts that were worded differently 
from the Constitution.  In recent times the courts have been more willing to examine why 
foreign courts arrived at certain results, but this has not necessarily led them to adopt the 
same conclusions that those courts reached.  It is likely that the courts’ choice of which 
foreign precedents are followed or rejected will depend on whether they remain 
deferential to the policy choices of the political branches of government, or develop 
constitutional principles to subject these choices to greater scrutiny. 
 
On November 6, 2012, Sundaresh Menon became the fourth Chief 
Justice of Singapore since the nation gained independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1963 and became a state of the Federation of Malaysia.  
Although Singapore was to leave Malaysia two years later in 1965 to 
become a wholly independent republic, 1963 remains significant as the year 
in which the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Malaysian Constitution 
were extended to Singapore.  For the first time, it became possible for the 
courts to strike down executive action and legislation inconsistent with these 
rights, a power they continue to possess today.  As 2013 marked the 50th 
anniversary of these momentous events, it is apposite to assess how the 
Supreme Court has carried out constitutional adjudication during the terms 
of the first three Chief Justices—Wee Chong Jin (January 5, 1963 –
September 27, 1990), Yong Pung How (September 28, 1990 – April 10, 
                                                   
† Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University.  My thanks are 
due to Marie-Claire Ponthoreau and Tania Groppi for reviewing an earlier version of the article for the XIX 
International Congress of Constitutional Law in Vienna, Austria, July 20-26, 2014; to my research 
assistants Teo Xuan Lang and Wong Joon Wee for their hard work; and to the University for providing a 
research grant (13-C234-SMU-007) to support the writing of this article. 
254 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 2 
2006) and Chan Sek Keong (April 11, 2006 – November 5, 2012)—and the 
first year in office of Sundaresh Menon. 
Specifically, this article examines how the courts have engaged with 
foreign jurisprudence—that is, judgments from courts of other jurisdictions 
and international courts such as the European Court of Human Rights.  It 
approaches the question by first explaining the framework for constitutional 
adjudication in Singapore, then by reviewing the use of foreign precedents in 
such adjudication.  Finally, it offers some conclusions on the role that 
foreign precedents have played.  The aim is to try and gauge whether the 
Singapore courts are engaged in a transjudicial dialogue—i.e. when 
“performing their adjudicatory functions [and] find[ing] inspiration in 
foreign case law, [whether they are] engaging in a conversation with other 
judges worldwide.”1 
 
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
 
In order to appreciate the Singapore courts’ role in interpreting and 
applying the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore,2 the framework for 
constitutional adjudication is briefly described here.  Following World War 
II, Singapore was a Crown colony and then a self-governing state of the 
United Kingdom.3  Singapore then left the British Empire by becoming a 
state of the Federation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963.  It was also 
during this time that a bill of rights—Part II of the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution, entitled “Fundamental Liberties”4—first became applicable to 
Singapore.  The Constitution of the State of Singapore5 (the “1963 State 
Constitution”) itself lacked such a recitation of rights.  However, merger 
with Malaysia was short-lived, and Singapore became an independent 
republic on August 9, 1965.  The Parliament of Singapore cobbled together a 
constitution from the 1963 State Constitution, certain provisions of the 
Malaysian Constitution (which were made applicable by the Republic of 
                                                   
1  Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, Introduction: The Methodology of the Research: How 
to Assess the Reality of Transjudicial Communication?, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 1, 1 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013). 
2  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint). 
3  As a Crown colony from 1955 onwards, a Governor headed Singapore, and its Legislative Council 
consisted of members both appointed by the United Kingdom government and elected by the people.  After 
becoming a self-governing state in 1959, Singapore gained a wholly elected Legislative Assembly led by a 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet.  C[ONSTANCE] M[ARY] TURNBULL, A HISTORY OF MODERN SINGAPORE 
1819–2005 244-45, 268-69 (2009). 
4 Federal Constitution (Malay.). 
5   Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (State Constitutions) Order in Council, 1963, S.I. 1963/1493 (U.K.) 
(containing the Constitution of the State of Singapore (1963)). 
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Singapore Independence Act 1965), 6  and the latter Act itself. 7   The 
fundamental liberties clauses were among the provisions imported from 
Malaysia at this time.8 
Two provisions of the 1963 State Constitution that became part of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore9 merit particular mention.  Article 
52 of the 1963 State Constitution, which was reworded and renumbered as 
Article 4 of the present Constitution, states: “This Constitution is the 
supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law enacted by the 
Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is 
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be void.”10  Article 105(1) of the 1963 State Constitution is now Article 162 
of the present Constitution, and reads as follows: 
Subject to this Article, all existing laws shall continue in force 
on and after the commencement of this Constitution and all 
laws which have not been brought into force by the date of the 
commencement of this Constitution may, subject as aforesaid, 
be brought into force on or after its commencement, but all 
such laws shall, subject to this Article, be construed as from the 
commencement of this Constitution with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary 
to bring them into conformity with this Constitution.11 
Together, these provisions emphasize the supremacy of the 
Constitution over ordinary legislation inconsistent with it.  Article 162 
makes laws that existed before August 9, 196512 continue in force after 
Singapore’s independence, but requires them to conform with the 
                                                   
6  Republic of Singapore Independence Act (Act 9 of 1965) s 6(1) [hereinafter RISA].  The RISA 
was passed on Dec. 22, 1965, and made retrospective to August 9, 1965. 
7  Kevin Tan Yew Lee, The Evolution of Singapore’s Modern Constitution: Developments from 
1945 to the Present Day, 1 SING. ACAD. L. J. 1, 17 (1989).  The RSIA appears in form to be an ordinary 
statute enacted by Parliament, but the High Court regarded it as part of the Singapore Constitution.  
Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 698 at [111]. 
8  Note that the RSIA omitted the right to property guaranteed by Article 13 of the Malaysian 
Constitution.  Republic of Singapore Independence Act (Act 9 of 1965) s 6(3).  This was to ensure the 
constitutionality of the Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152, 1985 Rev Ed), which would be enacted the 
following year.  See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 December 1965) vol 24 at cols 
435-36 (Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister).  At the time, the Act empowered the Government to compulsorily 
acquire private land for public purposes without providing persons interested in the land with compensation 
at the prevailing market rate.  Compensation was adjusted to the market rate in 2007.  See Bryan Chew et 
al., Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Singapore: A Fair Regime?, 22 SING. ACAD. L. J. 166, 167 (2010). 
9  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint). 
10  Id. at Art 4. 
11  Id. at Art 162. 
12  Id. at Art 2(1) (definition of the word “commencement”). 
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Constitution by being “construed . . . with such modifications, adaptations, 
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary.”  Article 4 states that 
laws enacted after August 9, 1965 that are inconsistent with the Constitution 
are void.  Read in the light of Article 162, this appears to suggest that laws 
enacted before that date are not wholly invalid but need only be construed in 
line with the Constitution.  However, in Tan Eng Hong v. Public 
Prosecutor,13 the Court of Appeal, Singapore’s highest court, held that, on a 
purposive interpretation of Articles 4 and 162, legislation enacted before 
August 9, 1965 that infringes upon the Constitution is also of no effect.14 
The Constitution does not specify which organ of state is generally 
responsible for determining the constitutionality of executive action or 
legislation.  Soon after the Federation of Malaya gained its independence 
from the British in 1957, the power to do so was implicitly asserted by its 
courts.15  This exercise of judicial review continued when Singapore joined 
the Federation in 1963 and subsequently achieved full independence in 
1965. 16   In 2011, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that, because the 
Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme Court,17 it has “jurisdiction 
to adjudicate on every legal dispute on a subject matter in respect of which 
Parliament has conferred jurisdiction on it, including any constitutional 
dispute between the State and an individual.”18  This conclusion makes it 
                                                   
13  Tan Eng Hong v. Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) (Sing.). 
14  Id. at [506]. 
15  Chia Khin Sze v. The Mentri Besar, State of Selangor [1958] 1 M.L.J. 105 (Malay.) (addressing 
whether the right to counsel guaranteed by Article 5(3) of the Constitution applies to inquiries held 
pursuant to the Restricted Residence Enactment of 1933, Act 377 (Federated Malay. States)); B. Surinder 
Singh Kanda v. The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 M.L.J. 169, 322 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from Malay.) (issue of whether appellant’s dismissal from the police force by the Commissioner of Police 
was invalid because it was not effected by the Police Service Commission depended on whether provisions 
of the Police Ordinance 1952, Ordinance 14 (Federation of Malaya), were inconsistent with Articles 135(1) 
and 144(1) of the Constitution).  See also S. Jayakumar, Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Power in 
Malaysia, 4(1) MALAYA L. REV. 96, 97 (1967) (“The ‘supremacy’ of the Constitution is effected by giving 
the Courts the power to review governmental actions which violate these limits.”). 
16  See, e.g., Osman v. Public Prosecutor [1968–1970] SLR(R) 117 at [16-24] (PC) (appeal taken 
from Sing.) (The Privy Council, then Singapore’s final appellate court, was called upon to assess the 
constitutionality of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act of 1964 (Malay.).). 
17  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 93 (“The judicial 
power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate courts as may be provided 
by any written law for the time being in force.”). 
18  Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [31] (CA) (Sing.) [hereinafter Yong Vui 
Kong v. A.G.].  See also Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [50] (Sing.) 
(“The court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are observed.  The 
court also has a duty to declare invalid any exercise of power, legislative and executive, which exceeds the 
limits of the power conferred by the Constitution, or which contravenes any prohibition which the 
Constitution provides.”); Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 410 at [89] (CA) (Sing.) 
(“The courts, in upholding the rule of law in Singapore, will no doubt readily invalidate laws that derogate 
from the Constitution which is the supreme law of our land.”); Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v. Public 
Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at [14] (CA) (Sing.) (The nation’s Westminster-model legal system “is based 
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clear that the duty of securing observance of the Constitution by the political 
branches of government falls upon the courts as an aspect of judicial power, 
and is analogous to rulings in other jurisdictions such as the seminal 
judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison.19   
Until April 8, 1994, 20 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
based in the United Kingdom was Singapore’s final appellate court21 and the 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.  Today, primary responsibility for 
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution lies with the Supreme Court, 
which has two divisions: the Court of Appeal, which is Singapore’s final 
appellate court; and the High Court, which exercises original jurisdiction in 
weighty matters.22  The High Court has suggested that “[w]here questions of 
law have already been decided or principles relating to an article in the 
Constitution have been set out by the superior courts, a subordinate court . . . 
should proceed to apply the relevant case law or extrapolate from the 
principles enunciated to reach a proper conclusion on the facts before it.”23  
Thus, the State Courts—the lower courts in Singapore—are confined to 
issuing declarations as to constitutionality;24  they possess no power to 
exercise supervisory jurisdiction over tribunals or public authorities, 
judicially review the acts or decisions of any persons or authorities, or issue 
prerogative orders.25  Only the High Court may do so.26  As in the United 
Kingdom, constitutional issues are dealt with by the ordinary hierarchy of 
                                                                                                                                                       
on the supremacy of the Singapore Constitution, with the result that the Singapore courts may declare an 
Act of the Singapore parliament invalid for inconsistency with the Singapore Constitution and, hence, null 
and void.”). 
19  5 U.S. 137, 176-78 (1803).  
20  Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act (Act 16 of 1993) (Sing.); Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act (Act 17 of 1993) (Sing.); Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act (Act 2 
of 1994) (Sing.).  Appeals to the Privy Council had been restricted from 1989.  Appeals were only possible 
in civil cases if all the parties to the proceedings consented, and in criminal matters where the death penalty 
had been imposed but the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision had not been unanimous.  Judicial 
Committee (Amendment) Act (Act 21 of 1989) (Sing.). 
21  Judicial Committee Act (Act 37 of 1966) (Sing.); Constitution (Amendment) Act (Act 19 of 1969) 
(Sing.). 
22  The High Court’s original jurisdiction is unlimited, but if a party commences an action in the High 
Court without a proper reason and only succeeds in recovering a sum which could have been sued for in a 
Subordinate Court, he or she will only be awarded costs on the State Courts scale.  State Courts Act (Cap 
321, 2007 Rev Ed) s 39. 
23  Johari bin Kanadi v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 422 at [9] (Sing.). 
24  State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) s 31(2)(b) (Dist. Cts.) and s 52(1B)(b)(ii) (Magis. Cts.). 
25  Id. at s 19(3)(a)–(b) (Dist. Cts.) and s 52(2) (Magis. Cts.).  The prerogative orders are the 
mandatory order (formerly known as “mandamus”), prohibiting order (“prohibition”), quashing order 
(“certiorari”), and order for review of detention (“habeas corpus”).  Id. at s 19(3)(b). 
26  Regarding the High Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction, see Ng Chye Huey v. Public 
Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 106 at [49, 53] (CA) (Sing.); regarding its power to issue prerogative orders, 
see the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18(2). 
258 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 2 
courts, which also deal with private law matters, rather than by a specialized 
constitutional court.27 
The independence of the Supreme Court judges to exercise judicial 
power, including constitutional judicial review, is generally safeguarded by 
provisions in Part VIII of the Constitution.28  These include prohibitions 
against the offices of judges being abolished,29 as well as their remuneration 
and other terms of office being altered to their disadvantage after 
appointment;30 tenure until the age of 65 years;31 a stringent process for 
removing a judge from his or her office;32 and requiring no less than a 
quarter of the total number of Members of Parliament to give notice of a 
substantive motion before a judge’s conduct can be discussed in 
Parliament.33 
The foregoing description shows that Singapore’s legal system has 
features similar to those of many common law jurisdictions.  Notably, it 
possesses a written constitution containing a bill of rights, and its courts 
have asserted a duty to strike down ordinary legislation that infringes upon 
the Constitution.  Since some of these other jurisdictions routinely refer to 
foreign precedents when engaging in constitutional adjudication, it is 
interesting to assess the extent to which the Singapore courts do so as well. 
 
I.  FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
 
A.   Methodology 
 
To examine the role of foreign precedents in constitutional 
adjudication in Singapore, reported and unreported constitutional cases 
decided between September 16, 1963 and December 31, 2013 that were 
                                                   
27  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 100(1) provides that 
the President may refer to a tribunal of not less than three Supreme Court judges for its opinion on “any 
question as to the effect of any provision of this Constitution which has arisen or appears to him likely to 
arise.”  However, the President’s discretion to refer such matters must be exercised in accordance with the 
advice of the Cabinet or a minister acting under the Cabinet’s general authority.  Id. Art 21(1).  In this 
respect, the President has no power to exercise personal discretion or act against the Cabinet’s advice.  Cf. 
Yong Vui Kong v. A.G. [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [157, 180] (CA) (Sing.).  Thus, persons may not have 
constitutional questions referred by the President to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Tribunal 
as a matter of right. 
28  See generally Michael Hor, The Independence of the Criminal Justice System in Singapore, 2002 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 497; Chan Sek Keong, Securing and Maintaining Judicial Independence, 22 SING. 
ACAD. L.J. 229 (2010). 
29  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 95(3). 
30  Id. at Art 98(8). 
31  Id. at Art 98(1). 
32  Id. at Art 98(2)–(5). 
33  Id. at Art 99. 
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available on LawNet, a subscription-based online database, were 
examined.34  These included judgments of the Privy Council hearing appeals 
from Singapore, as well as judgments of the upper and lower divisions of the 
Supreme Court of Singapore—the Court of Appeal and the High Court.35  
These judgments were reported in various series of law reports, which are 
described below. 
Between 1963 and 1991, selected judgments of the Privy Council, the 
Court of Appeal and the High Court were reported in the Malaya Law 
Journal (“M.L.J.”).36  From 1992, this task was assumed by the Singapore 
Law Reports (“S.L.R.”), which were published by Butterworths Asia on the 
authority of the Singapore Academy of Law (“S.A.L.”).  In 1996, 
Butterworths reproduced Singapore judgments that had appeared in the 
M.L.J. between 1965 and 1991 in a series of S.L.R. volumes.  Having 
formed a Council of Law Reporting, the Academy took over responsibility 
for publishing the law reports in 2003, and in 2010, reissued the 1965–2010 
judgments that had appeared in the S.L.R. in a series called the Singapore 
Law Reports (Reissue) (“S.L.R.(R.)”).37  As the courts require judgments in 
the S.L.R.(R.) to be cited in preference to those in the S.L.R.,38 judgments 
published in the S.L.R.(R.) from August 9, 1965 to December 31, 2010, 
which are available on LawNet, were used.  Judgments in the M.L.J. were 
consulted for the period of September 16, 1963 to August 8, 1965, and those 
in the S.L.R. for the period of January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013.  
LawNet also contains unreported judgments, but only has a consistent set of 
these starting from the 2000s.  Earlier judgments are archived by the 
Registry of the Supreme Court, but as these have not been digitized and 
                                                   
34  LawNet, which is managed by the Singapore Academy of Law, contains, among other things, 
reported and unreported judgments of the Supreme Court and State Courts, judgments from courts of other 
countries such as Malaysia and the United Kingdom, journal articles, and textbooks.  LAWNET, 
www.lawnet.com.sg (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
35  From colonial times until 1993, Singapore had a separate Court of Appeal (which dealt with civil 
appeals) and Court of Criminal Appeal.  The system of having two appellate courts was confirmed after 
Singapore’s independence by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Act 24 of 1969), and was eventually 
replaced by the present unitary Court of Appeal through the enactment of the Supreme Court of Judicature 
(Amendment) Act (Act 16 of 1993) and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 
(Act 17 of 1993).  See Kevin Tan Yew Lee, A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore, in THE 
SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM 26, 40, 51–52 (Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999 (2003 reprint)).  In this 
article, in regard to the period prior to when the unitary Court of Appeal was established, the term “Court of 
Appeal” refers to the Court of Criminal Appeal as well. 
36  In fact, the Malayan Law Journal published cases originating from Singapore beginning in 1932.  
See G. W. Bartholomew & Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan, A History of Law Reporting, in ESSAYS IN SINGAPORE 
LEGAL HISTORY 139, 152 (Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan ed., 2005). 
37  Id. at 154-56; Law Reporting, SINGAPORE ACADEMY OF LAW, http://www.sal.org.sg/content/LK_ 
law_reporting.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). 
38  Supreme Court Practice Directions, para. 74(6), https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ 
ManagePage/98/ePD_WebHelp/ePD.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
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uploaded to LawNet, there is presently no convenient way to access or 
assess them.  Thus, such judgments were not considered for this article. 
Cases were regarded as ‘constitutional’ if they involved the 
application of provisions of the Constitution.  In each judgment, the number 
of foreign precedents cited by judges in the course of constitutional 
adjudication was counted, except for foreign precedents mentioned in 
quotations which were disregarded.  A court was treated as having engaged 
in constitutional adjudication if it considered the meaning of a constitutional 
provision, applied such a provision to a factual scenario, or dealt with 
procedural issues relevant to constitutional law, such as standing (locus 
standi) or remedies.  By the same token, foreign precedents cited in portions 
of judgments concerning other matters (for example, issues of criminal law 
or private law) were ignored.  Finally, given space constraints, only cases 
regarded as particularly illustrative of the courts’ trends in referring to 
foreign precedents were selected for discussion in this article. 
 
B.  Findings 
 
1.  Number of Constitutional Judgments 
 
Using the methodology described above, the study found 153 cases 
between 1963 and 2013 that qualified as ‘constitutional cases’ for this 
analysis, averaging 3.06 cases each year. 39   This is a small number 
considering that during the nine-year period between 2000 and 2008, the 
High Court of Australia decided 193 constitutional cases (21.44 cases per 
year),40 and in the 29 years between 1982 and 2010, the Supreme Court of 
Canada determined 949 of such cases (32.72 cases per year).41  Undoubtedly, 
the fact that Singapore’s population—5,399,200 as of June 201342—is much 
smaller than that of Australia and Canada has an impact on the number of 
cases brought before its courts.  However, population does not appear to be 
strictly determinative of constitutional litigation rates.  In Ireland, which has 
                                                   
39  To calculate this figure, the number of 153 constitutional cases was divided by 50 years.  However, 
to be precise, the period from September 16, 1963 to December 31, 2013 is 50 years, 3 months, and 15 days. 
40  Cheryl Saunders & Adrienne Stone, Reference to Foreign Precedents by the Australian High 
Court: A Matter of Method, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 23 (Tania 
Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013) 
41  Gianluca Gentili, Canada: Protecting Rights in a ‘Worldwide Rights Culture’: An Empirical Study 
of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982–2010), in THE USE OF FOREIGN 
PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 53, table 1 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 
2013). 
42  NATIONAL POPULATION AND TALENT DIVISION, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE ET AL., POPULATION IN 
BRIEF 2013 4-5 (2013), available at www.nptd.gov.sg/portals/0/news/population-in-brief-2013.pdf. 
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an estimated population of 4,593,100 as of April 2013,43 the Supreme Court 
decided 902 constitutional cases over the 74-year period between 1937 and 
2010 (12.19 cases per year).44  At this point, we can only speculate about the 
reasons for the low number of constitutional cases in Singapore.  It may be 
that Singaporeans are generally less litigious than nationals of other 
countries, and that they are particularly reluctant to take legal action against 
public authorities for fear that doing so will trigger some form of backlash in 
future dealings with the authorities. 
The low success rate of constitutional claims may also be a factor.  In 
the 50 years since 1963, there have only been three cases in which the courts 
held that the government’s interpretation of constitutional provisions was 
incorrect.  The 1988 case of Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs45 
concerned whether certain provisions in the Internal Security Act (“ISA”)46 
should be interpreted as conferring on the Minister a subjective or objective 
discretion.  The Act empowers the Minister for Home Affairs to detain 
without trial persons believed to pose a national security risk, and to suspend 
and revoke the suspension of such detention orders.  The Court of Appeal 
held that construing the Minister’s discretion as subjective would, among 
other things, violate the guarantee of equal protection in Article 12(1) of the 
Constitution,47 and the vesting of judicial power in the courts by Article 93.48  
However, the remarks were obiter dicta, and Parliament swiftly neutralized 
any potential legal effect by means of amendments to the Constitution and 
the ISA, which came into effect less than two months after the judgment was 
handed down.49  About a decade later in 1998, the High Court ruled in Taw 
Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor50 that one of the sections of the Prevention 
of Corruption Act51 infringed Article 12(1).  This decision was overturned 
by the Court of Appeal.52  Most recently, in 2013, the Court of Appeal 
                                                   
43  Population and Migration Estimates: April 2013, CENTRAL STATISTICS 
OFFICE, http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2013/ (l
ast visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
44  Cristina Fasone, The Supreme Court of Ireland and the Use of Foreign Precedents: The Value of 
Constitutional History, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 116 (Tania 
Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013). 
45  Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (CA) (Sing.). 
46  Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed). 
47  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 12(1) (“All persons 
are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”). 
48  Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [79-82] (CA) (Sing.). 
49  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act (Act 1 of 1989); Internal Security 
(Amendment) Act (Act 2 of 1989). 
50  Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 (Sing.). 
51  Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 241, 1993 Rev. Ed.). 
52  Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 (CA) (Sing.). 
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determined in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General53  that the 
Government’s interpretation of Article 49(1) of the Constitution was 
incorrect.  This provision reads as follows: 
 
Whenever the seat of a Member, not being a non-constituency 
Member, has become vacant for any reason other than a 
dissolution of Parliament, the vacancy shall be filled by election 
in the manner provided by or under any law relating to 
Parliamentary elections for the time being in force.54 
 
The Government asserted that the provision conferred upon it the 
discretion to decide that a by-election need not be held to fill a casual 
vacancy that arises in Parliament, and that it is permissible to leave the seat 
vacant until the next general election.  While the High Court agreed with this 
interpretation,55 the Court of Appeal did not.56  Ultimately, though, its view 
on the matter was obiter, as it also found that the appellant lacked standing 
by the time the appeal was heard—the by-election in question had already 
been called and concluded.57 
Nevertheless, as Figure 1 below shows, there appears to be a broad 
trend towards more constitutional cases being brought.  The increase began 
in 1987 when six judgments were rendered; before that, there were no more 
than four judgments a year.  Since then, the number of constitutional 
judgments has fluctuated.  There have been periods such as 1991–1995, 
1999–2004, and 2007–2010 (except 2008) when the number of judgments 
has fallen—in fact, no judgments were rendered in 1993 and 2002.  
However, in between those fallow periods the number of judgments 
rebounded, reaching highs in 2006 (nine judgments) and 2012 (13 
judgments). 
 
                                                   
53  Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 (CA) (Sing.). 
54  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 49(1). 
55  Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 698 (Sing.). 
56  Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 at [54-82] (CA) (Sing.). 
57  See id. at [11-44]. 
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It is hard to be definitive about the reasons for the trend. There does 
not appear to be any common thread linking the six judgments decided in 
1987.  However, five of the judgments issued between 1988 and 1990 relate 
to habeas corpus applications challenging the legality of detentions under the 
ISA resulting from Operation Spectrum.58  This was a security operation 
launched by the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in 1987 against persons said to have been acting “in a manner 
prejudicial to the security of Singapore by being involved in a Marxist 
conspiracy to subvert the existing social and political system in Singapore, 
using communist united front tactics, with a view to establishing a Marxist 
state.”59  Such allegations were rejected by the detainees.60  Similarly, a 
number of the judgments issued between 1996 and 1998 result from action 
having been taken against Jehovah’s Witnesses for membership in an 
unlawful society,61 possession of unlawful publications,62 and refusing to 
                                                   
58  De Souza Kevin Desmond and others v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 1 SLR(R) 464 (Sing.); 
Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 30 (Sing.); Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for 
Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (Sing.); Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 1 SLR(R) 
461 (Sing.); Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 347 (CA) (Sing.); Cheng Vincent 
v. Minister for Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 38 (Sing.). 
59  Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [4] (Sing.). 
60  On the legal aspects of Operation Spectrum generally, see Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Shall the Twain 
Never Meet? Competing Narratives and Discourses of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 298, 307-13. 
61  Chan Cheow Khiang v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 620 (Sing.); Kok Hoong Tan Dennis 
and others v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 (Sing.). 
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participate in a school ceremony involving the raising of the National Flag 
and recitation of the National Pledge.63  Apart from these two lines of cases, 
there do not appear to be any overarching themes unifying the increased 
numbers of constitutional cases. 
The general upturn in the number of constitutional judgments may 
also be partly attributable to an increasing awareness of rights and, thus, a 
willingness to challenge government policy through the courts.  On 
September 1, 2000, the Government established Speakers’ Corner at Hong 
Lim Park by exempting people wishing to speak at that venue from having 
to apply for a license under the Public Entertainments Act.64  During a 
parliamentary debate on the subject, Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan 
Seng said that although the Government had not initially favored the idea 
due to concerns over the “potential for public disorder in our multi-racial, 
multi-religious society,” after further study, it felt that “the risk can be 
managed, and the idea is worth trying out, especially in view of the support 
it has attracted from civil society groups.”65  He commented, “[I]n the end, 
we thought that if that is really what the people want and we can manage the 
risk, we will provide for it.  Basically, if the people really want this, we will 
let them try it out.  We hope that they can make it succeed.”66  With effect 
from 2008, it became permissible to hold demonstrations at Speakers’ 
Corner.67  The venue has been used regularly for various events, including 
an annual LGBT event called Pink Dot SG68 and a February 2013 protest 
against a white paper on population growth69 issued by the Government.70 
                                                                                                                                                       
62  Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v. Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294 
(Sing.); Liong Kok Keng v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 683 (Sing.). 
63  Peter Williams Nappalli v. Institute of Technical Education [1998] SGHC 351 (Sing.); Nappalli 
Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education [1998] 2 SLR(R) 529 (CA) (Sing.). 
64  Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Rev Ed).  The exemption was originally effected by the 
Public Entertainments (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) Order 2000 (G.N. No. S 364/2000), and at present 
by the Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) (No. 2) Order 2011 (G.N. No. 
S 493/2011) and the Public Order (Unrestricted Area) (No. 2) Order 2011 (G.N. No. S 494/2011).  For 
commentary, see Thio Li-ann, Singapore: Regulating Political Speech and the Commitment ‘to Build a 
Democratic Society’, 1(3) INT’L J. CONST. L. 516 (2003). 
65  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 April 2000) vol 72 at col 21 (Wong Kan 
Seng, Minister for Home Affairs).  
66  Id. at col 25. 
67  Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) Order 2008 (G.N. No. S 
426/2008). 
68  First held in 2009; see Nur Dianah Suhaimi, 1,000 Turn Up in Pink at Event, 
THE STRAITS TIMES (May 17, 2009), http://news.asiaone.com/News/the+Straits+Times/Story/A1Story2009
0517-141933.html; Sharanjit Leyl, Singapore Gays in First Public Rally, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8054402.stm. 
69  NATIONAL POPULATION AND TALENT DIVISION, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, POPULATION WHITE 
PAPER: A SUSTAINABLE POPULATION FOR A DYNAMIC SINGAPORE (2013). 
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The 2000s also saw the establishment of civil society organizations, 
such as the Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (HOME), 
which works to counter human trafficking and labor exploitation,71 and 
MARUAH, a human rights non-governmental organization.72  On October 
22, 2007, Nominated Member of Parliament Siew Kum Hong presented a 
public petition to Parliament calling for the repeal of section 377A of the 
Penal Code.73  This section criminalizes acts of “gross indecency” between 
male persons in public or private places.  The petition sought to repeal on the 
grounds that section 377A violates the guarantee of equality and equal 
protection in the Constitution.74  Parliament debated the petition for two 
days during the Second Reading of a bill to overhaul the Penal Code, but a 
majority of the House ultimately voted to retain the provision in the Code.75  
Subsequently, high-profile legal suits challenged the constitutionality of 
section 377A.76 
Further challenges were also mounted to the Government’s assertion 
that it has discretion not to call a by-election to fill a casual vacancy in 
Parliament,77 and its grant of a contingent loan of U.S. $4 billion to the 
International Monetary Fund without the President’s concurrence.78  It is 
submitted that the visibility of such cases, and the increasing opportunities 
for Singaporeans to express and share opinions freely at Speakers’ Corner 
and on the Internet, emboldens citizens.  This, together with greater 
participation in activities organized by civil society groups, will cause them 
                                                                                                                                                       
70  4,000 Turn Up at Speakers’ Corner for Population White Paper Protest, YAHOO! NEWS 
SINGAPORE (Feb. 16, 2013), http://sg.news.yahoo.com/huge-turnout-at-speakers--corner-for-population-
white-paper-protest-101051153.html; Goh Chin Lian & Maryam Mokhtar, White Paper Protest Draws Big 
Crowd, THE STRAITS TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/huge-turnout-at-speakers--corner-
for-population-white-paper-protest-101051153.html. 
71  Registered as a society under the Societies Act (Cap 311, 1985 Rev Ed), on September 6, 2004; 
see also Mission & Vision, HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATION FOR MIGRATION ECONOMICS, 
http://home.org.sg/mission-vision/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). 
72  Established in 2007; see Cassandra Chew, Human Rights Group Maruah Gazetted as Political 
Body: Decision Means Group Can No Longer Accept Funding from Foreign Sources, THE STRAITS TIMES 
(Nov. 12, 2010). 
73  Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) s 377A. 
74 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2121. 
75 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at cols 2125ff,  
2354ff. 
76 Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 320 (Sing.); Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General 
[2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) (Sing.) (standing); Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 (Sing.); 
Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 (Sing.) (substantive issues); Lim Meng Suang  v. 
Attorney-General  [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA) (Sing.). 
77  Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 1033 (Sing.) (leave to apply for a 
prerogative order); Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 698 (Sing.); Vellama d/o 
Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 (CA) (Sing.) (substantive issues). 
78  Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2013] 1 SLR 619 (Sing.); Jeyaretnam Kenneth 
Andrew v. Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 (CA) (Sing.). 
266 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 2 
to continue to mature as a society, which may eventually lead to a continued 
increase in the number of constitutional cases each year. 
 
2.  Citation of Foreign Precedents 
 
Since the start of constitutional adjudication in 1963, Singaporean 
courts have consistently referred to foreign case law.  Reference to foreign 
precedents might be expected when a novel legal issue arises, or where it is 
thought desirable to test the local law against legal developments abroad.79  
Predictably, the number of foreign precedents cited tends to track the 
number of constitutional judgments delivered by the courts.  As Figure 2 
below shows, the increase in judgments between 1987 and 1990 was 
matched by a corresponding increase in the number of foreign precedents 
cited.  Thereafter, the number of judgments held more or less steady until 
1998, although there were drops in 1991, 1993, and 1997.  Subsequently, 
there was a decline between 1999 and 2007.  The numbers then began to 
pick up, reaching much higher levels than before in the years 2008 and 
2010–2013, broadly corresponding to the growing quantity of judgments 
since 2006. 
A selective examination of judgments from different periods suggests 
that Singapore courts have, on the whole, viewed foreign precedent with 
caution.  On some occasions courts applied such precedent, and on others, 
courts either distinguished or declined to apply them.  It appears that the 
courts took the latter route when the precedent did not comport with the 
judges’ view of their role in constitutional adjudication.  
                                                   
79  See, e.g., Goh Yihan & Paul Tan, An Empirical Study on the Development of Singapore Law, 23 
SING. ACAD. L.J. 176, 194 (2011). 
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a.  1963–1990: Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin 
 
A fairly cautious approach towards the application of foreign 
precedent is evident even in the period from 1963 to 1993, the first thirty 
years of the bill of rights in Singapore.  The courts were receptive to 
considering such precedent when related to the constitutional provisions of 
other jurisdictions with analogs to the Singapore Constitution; however, 
judges remained sensitive to textual differences.  Administrative law rules 
and matters of constitutional practice such as habeas corpus and 
parliamentary procedure, inherited from the British, also provided a basis for 
examining and applying Commonwealth precedent. 
For instance, in the 1971 judgment Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for 
Home Affairs,80 Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin (“Wee C.J.”), sitting as a High 
Court judge, considered a U.S. case, Johnson v. Zerbst,81 and an Indian case, 
V. Deshpande v. Emperor.82  Wee C.J. reviewed these cases to determine if 
an individual detained without trial under the ISA was entitled to be released 
if he had been wrongfully denied his right to counsel guaranteed by Article 
                                                   
80  Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 (Sing.). 
81  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
82  Vimlabai Deshpande v. King Emperor, 1945 A.I.R. (Bom.) 8 (Ind.).  
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5(3) of the Constitution.83  He distinguished Johnson v. Zerbst because the 
case stood for the principle that a federal court could only deprive an 
accused person of life or liberty if the individual had been accorded a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, unless the right had been waived.  If the court 
had not complied with this prerequisite, the conviction was void and the 
imprisonment unlawful.  If a retrial or appeal was no longer possible, the 
accused was thus entitled to be released from custody.  In contrast, the Chief 
Justice held there was an established principle (presumably a common law 
one, though he cited no authority) that habeas corpus is not available as a 
remedy unless the detainee’s detention is unlawful in some way, and he did 
not think it right to depart from that principle.  In other words, in Singapore, 
an infringement of an accused person’s right to counsel does not 
automatically render the detention unlawful. 
Turning to Deshpande, Wee C.J. did not find the case useful as the 
Indian court provided no justification for ordering the immediate release of 
the detainee.84  He went on to find that, despite the applicant’s contentions, 
the detention in question was not illegal. 
In holding the detention order valid, Wee C.J. cited Karam Singh v. 
Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia.85  
There the Federal Court of Malaya held that the relevant legislation did not 
require the order to be in any particular form.86  Karam Singh itself relied on 
decisions of the courts of the United Kingdom in R. v. Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs, ex parte Lees.87  The Court determined that the order was not 
illegal because the grounds and factual allegations on which it was based 
were so vague and unintelligible that the detainee was unable to make 
adequate representations to the advisory board reviewing the detention.88  In 
making this determination, the Chief Justice again distinguished the case 
from two judgments of the Supreme Court of India, 89 as the relevant 
provisions of the Indian Constitution were different from corresponding 
provisions of the Singapore Constitution.  He noted that Karam Singh, 
referred to above, had reached the same conclusion,90 and that holding 
                                                   
83  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 9(3) (originally 
enacted as Art 5(3)). 
84  Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [18-22] (Sing.).  
85  Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129 (Fed. Ct.) (Malay.). 
86  Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [35] (Sing.). 
87  Rex v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. 72 (Div. Ct.) (CA) (Eng. 
& Wales); see Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [36-40] (Sing.). 
88 Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [42-53] (Sing.). 
89  State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, 1951 A.I.R. S.C. 157 (India); Dr. Ram Krishan 
Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi, 1953 A.I.R. S.C. 318 (India). 
90  Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [42-53] (Sing.). 
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otherwise would be “wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Act,” under 
which no judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds for detention 
was possible.  This was a matter of subjective opinion for the President, 
acting upon the Cabinet’s advice.91 
Interestingly, the Attorney-General in Lee Mau Seng attempted to 
persuade the High Court to adopt what Professor Sujit Choudhry has called a 
“genealogical interpretation” of the Constitution—an interpretation based on 
the notion that it is acceptable to import and apply doctrines developed from 
one constitution to another constitution if the two charters are linked by 
relationships of genealogy and history.92  The Attorney-General advocated 
that the Court apply a Malaysian Federal Court judgment.93  The High Court 
regarded this authority as “unsettled and debatable,”94 and ruled against the 
Attorney-General after determining the issue solely by examining the 
Singapore Constitution’s provisions.95 
Genealogical interpretation has been more readily accepted by courts 
in other cases, notably those relating to Article 12(1) of the Constitution, 
which states: “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law.”  In Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor,96 
the High Court applied a ‘rational relation’ test to Article 12(1), holding that 
an impugned legislative provision is constitutional only if it classifies people 
according to an intelligible differentia, and the differentia bears a rational 
relation to the object of the provision.97  In reaching this decision, the court 
applied a Malaysian Federal Court of Criminal Appeal case, which had, in 
turn, followed a judgment of the Indian Supreme Court.98   
Genealogical interpretations, however, must be applied with 
circumspection.  It may not be appropriate to assume that simply by 
adopting constitutional texts similar to the basic charters of other 
jurisdictions, the legislative body intended for all related foreign legal 
doctrines to be applied locally as well.  The courts of a particular jurisdiction 
should always consider if foreign constitutional doctrines are able to shed 
                                                   
91  Id. at [54]. 
92  Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 838 (1999); Victor V. Ramraj, Comparative Constitutional 
Law in Singapore, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 302, 311-12 (2002); see also Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Interpreting 
Bills of Rights: The Value of a Comparative Approach, 5(1) INT’L J. CONST. L. 122, 129-30 (2007); Lee 
Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 (Sing.) 
93  Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia [1968] 1 M.L.J. 119 (Fed. Ct.) (Malay.). 
94  Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [30] (Sing.) 
95  Id. at [30-34]. 
96  Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor, [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 (Sing.). 
97  Id. at [34]. 
98  Datuk Haji Harun bin Harun Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 M.L.J. 155 (Ct. of Crim. App.) 
(Malay.) (citing Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1958 A.I.R. S.C. 538 (India)). 
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light on the provisions of the local bill of rights and contribute positively 
towards the development of their meaning.99 
In the 1988 case of Times Publishing Bhd v. Sivadas,100 the issue was 
whether written submissions to a parliamentary select committee are 
absolutely privileged.  In response to a notice issued by the Clerk of 
Parliament inviting members of the public to make representations on 
proposed changes to legislation regulating corporations, the defendant 
submitted written representations to the select committee.101  He was not 
invited to give oral evidence, but his representations were included in the 
committee’s report to Parliament.102  The plaintiffs felt they had been 
libelled by the defendant’s representations, and brought a defamation suit 
against him.103  In contrast to Lee Mau Seng, where foreign precedents were 
referred to but not found to be of assistance, the High Court in Times 
Publishing cited with approval numerous cases from Australia and the 
United Kingdom 104  to interpret relevant provisions of the Parliament 
(Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act,105 which was enacted pursuant to 
Article 63 of the Constitution.106  These cases were pertinent because section 
3(1) of the Act states that “[t]he privileges, immunities and powers of 
Parliament and of the Speaker, Members and committees of Parliament shall 
be the same as those of the Commons House of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom and of its Speaker, Members or committees at the establishment of 
the Republic of Singapore.”  Article 49 of the Australian Constitution107 is 
similar.108  The Court found that the defendant’s statements were absolutely 
privileged and could not form the basis of civil proceedings against him.109 
Later in 1988, the Court of Appeal embraced the approach taken in 
Times Publishing in the landmark judgment of Chng Suan Tze.110  Wee C.J. 
held that the United Kingdom cases applied in Karam Singh111 could no 
longer be regarded as correct, as the law cannot countenance unfettered 
executive discretion.  In doing so, he relied on decisions of the House of 
                                                   
99  Lee, supra note 92. 
100  Times Publishing Bhd. v. Sivadas [1988] 1 SLR(R) 572 (HC) (Sing.). 
101 Id. at 574-75. 
102 Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Times Publishing Bhd. v. Sivadas [1988] 1 SLR(R) 572 at [576-86] (HC) (Sing.). 
105  Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 217, 2000 Rev Ed). 
106 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 63 (“It shall be lawful 
for the Legislature by law to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities or powers of Parliament.”). 
107  AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 49. 
108  Times Publishing Bhd. v. Sivadas [1988] 1 SLR(R) 572 at [581] (HC) (Sing.). 
109  Id. at [586–89]. 
110  Supreme Court Practice Directions, supra note 38. 
111  Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129 (Fed. Ct.) (Malay.). 
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Lords and the Privy Council on appeal from Ceylon, Malaysia and the West 
Indies Associated States, and from courts in South-West Africa and 
Zimbabwe.112  Disapproving of his earlier ruling in Lee Mau Seng, he held 
that the authorities’ discretion to detain without trial under the ISA should 
henceforth be regarded as objective rather than subjective, and thus open to 
judicial review.113  
Shortly after the Chng Suan Tze judgment, the Singaporean 
Parliament issued a distinct rebuke to the Court by reinstating the law as it 
had been laid down in Lee Mau Seng. It inserted section 8B(1) into the ISA, 
which reads: 
 
[T]he law governing the judicial review of any decision made 
or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon the 
President or the Minister by the provisions of this Act shall be 
the same as was applicable and declared in Singapore on the 
13th day of July 1971; and no part of the law before, on or after 
that date of any other country in the Commonwealth relating to 
judicial review shall apply.114  
 
Speaking in Parliament during the Second Reading of the related bill 
amending the Constitution, the Minister for Law characterized the approach 
of the British courts as “interventionist” and criticized their willingness to 
“ignore or disregard the clear intent of the statutory provisions and go 
behind the decisions of the Executive.”115  The Minister said that “if we do 
not restore the subjective test in Lee Mau Seng, and if we allow foreign case 
law and precedents to allow the courts to be involved in an interventionist 
role, then we will have an untenable position . . . because our law on national 
security matters will be governed by cases decided abroad, in countries 
where conditions are totally different from ours.”116 
 
b. 1990–2006: Chief Justice Yong Pung How 
 
Wee C.J. retired at the end of September 1990.  During the term of his 
successor, Yong Pung How (“Yong C.J.”), the courts increasingly resisted 
                                                   
112  Id. 
113  Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [55-85, 139] (Sing.); see also 
Lee, Shall the Twain Never Meet?, supra note 60, at 309-10. 
114  Internal Security Act (ISA) (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed) s 8B(1). 
115 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 January 1989) vol 52 at cols 467-68 (S. 
Jayakumar, Minister for Law). 
116  Id. 
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applying foreign precedent.  Particularly in the second half of Yong C.J.’s 
term, the numbers of such judgments cited tended to be comparatively low.  
It is tempting to conclude that the courts were simply taking their cue from 
the Government’s dim view of the relevance of foreign jurisprudence,117 but 
there is no direct evidence of this.  However, it is worth noting that up to 
1991, the President appointed the Chief Justice and the judges of the 
Supreme Court and was obliged to follow the advice of the Prime Minister 
on the matter.118  In 1991, the Constitution was amended to make the 
President an office directly elected by the people, and he is now empowered 
to act in his personal discretion and disagree with the Prime Minister’s 
choice of Supreme Court judges.119  Nonetheless, this has not resulted in any 
significant change to the Cabinet’s ability to determine the composition of 
the Court.  To date, the President has not exercised his veto power.  In any 
case, if the President were to do so in the future, he would have to consult 
the Council of Presidential Advisers first.120  If the President’s refusal to 
make an appointment was contrary to the Council’s recommendation, 
Parliament could overrule his decision by obtaining at least a two-thirds vote 
of all elected Members of Parliament.121  At present, such a vote is not 
difficult to achieve, as the ruling People’s Action Party holds 80 out of the 
87 elected seats in Parliament.  This is not to say that persons nominated by 
the Cabinet for appointment as judges would inevitably be biased in favor of 
the Government’s views.  Chan Sek Keong, Singapore’s third Chief Justice, 
has robustly defended judicial independence, writing: 
 
[Independence from the Legislature means] that judges should 
not be adjudicating “with parliamentary approval or the 
avoidance of parliamentary reprobation in mind.”  It also means 
that judges should not be concerned about any adverse 
criticisms by Members of Parliament on the decisions of the 
courts affecting them or their party.  Nor should judges be 
afraid to strike down Acts of Parliament which are inconsistent 
with the constitution . . . . With respect to the Executive, this 
                                                   
117  See, e.g., Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Comparative Law and Constitutional Interpretation in 
Singapore: Insights from Constitutional Theory, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE 
SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 114, 121 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin Y. L. Tan eds., 2009).  
118  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 95(1)-(2) (Before 
tendering advice as to the appointment of Supreme Court judges other than the Chief Justice, the Prime 
Minister was required to consult the Chief Justice.). 
119  Id. at Art 22(1)(a), 95(1). 
120  Id. at Art 21(3). 
121  Id. at Art 22(2). 
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means, for one, that a judge should not tailor judicial decisions 
to ingratiate himself or herself with the Executive for whatever 
reason, be it for promotion or otherwise.  The courts must also 
not shy away from exercising their power of judicial review to 
correct, and if necessary nullify, any executive act or decision 
which is contrary to its statutory powers for fear of executive 
reaction.122 
 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Prime Minister would 
naturally advise the President to appoint as judges women and men who 
generally share the Government’s philosophy towards governance, rather 
than people who have publicly evinced an inclination to disagree with its 
policies.  As this article later addresses, however, this does not explain the 
change in judicial approach beginning in 2006. 
During the 1990–2006 period, constitutional cases saw a more 
skeptical analysis of foreign precedents.  In particular, several litigants failed 
to convince the courts to adopt theories based on European and U.S. cases.  
In the 1992 case Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew,123 the 
appellant, an opposition politician, sought to rely on the common law 
defense of qualified privilege when sued for defamation by the then Prime 
Minister.124  The appellant particularly emphasized125 the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision New York Times v. Sullivan126 and that of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Lingens v. Austria.127  He argued that Article 
14(1)(a) of the Singaporean Constitution, which guarantees citizens the right 
to freedom of speech and expression,128 required the qualified privilege 
defense to be modified if the statement relates to the conduct of public 
officials, even when the statement is publically made.  The Court of Appeal 
declined to follow these decisions because “[t]he terms of Art 14 of our 
Constitution differ materially from the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the Constitution of the United States and also from Art 10 of the European 
                                                   
122  Chan Sek Keong, Securing and Maintaining the Independence of the Court in Judicial 
Proceedings, 22 SING. ACAD. L.J. 229, 242-43 (2010) (citations omitted). 
123  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 (CA) (Sing.). 
124  Id. at [74-76] (citing Blackshaw v. Lord, [1984] Q.B. 1 (CA) (Eng.)) (Traditionally, a person may 
only rely on qualified privilege as a defense to the tort of defamation if (1) he or she is under a legal, moral, 
or social duty to make the impugned statement; and (2) it is made to people with a corresponding duty to 
receive it.  In the absence of such a correspondence of duty, the defense does not apply to statements which 
are of general public interest.). 
125  Id. at [43]. 
126  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
127  Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407 (1986). 
128 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 14(1)(a) (“[E]very 
citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression.”). 
274 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 2 
Convention on Human Rights.”129  The Court of Appeal noted that, unlike 
the First Amendment, Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution does not 
expressly prohibit the legislature from making laws abridging the freedom of 
speech or freedom of the press.  The Court of Appeal also noted that Article 
10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that 
the exercise of free speech is subject to “restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . . for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others,”130 is a phraseology that does 
not appear in Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution.  Since Article 14(2)(a) 
merely states that “Parliament may by law impose . . . restrictions . . . to 
provide against . . . defamation,”131 Parliament may freely impose such 
restrictions on the right to freedom of speech as it sees fit.  Parliament did so 
by providing for the continued application of the common law of defamation 
in Singapore following the nation’s independence in 1965.132  This approach 
has been criticized as excessively literal.133 
Despite the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jeyaretnam not to apply 
European and U.S. precedents, the Court appeared to act inconsistently in its 
adoption and rejection of foreign cases.  The Court did not find the New 
York Times and Lingens judgments relevant.  It did look to three Canadian 
cases to buttress its point that public officials are entitled to have their 
reputations protected by the law, and that any extension of the qualified 
privilege defense was undesirable.134  These cases were delivered before the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms135 came into force;136 the Court 
neither explained why it preferred these cases despite the lack of a rights-
based context at the time they were decided, nor considered whether they 
would still be regarded by the Canadian courts as persuasive.  It could be 
said that the Court adopted a “dialogical interpretation” of bills of rights, an 
                                                   
129  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 at [56] (CA) (Sing.). 
130 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(2), Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (emphasis added). 
131  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 14(2)(a) (“Parliament 
may by law impose—(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers necessary 
or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other 
countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to 
provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence.”). 
132  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 at [56-59] (CA) (Sing.). 
133  Michael Hor, The Freedom of Speech and Defamation: Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan 
Yew, 1992 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 542, 547-48 (1992). 
134  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 at [62-65] (CA) (Sing.). 
135 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B 
to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
136  See Thiruvengadam, supra note 117, at 121-22; see also Li-ann Thio, Beyond the ‘Four Walls’ in 
an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations: Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional 
Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 428, 472-74 (2006). 
APRIL 2015 FOREIGN PRECEDENTS 
 
 
275 
acceptable technique of constitutional adjudication.137  In doing so, judges 
merely use foreign precedent “instrumentally, as a means to stimulate 
constitutional self-reflection,”138 and do not make any normative claims 
based on foreign precedent.139  However, applying precedent in this manner 
can too easily be misconstrued and can come across as cherry-picking if 
judges do not provide convincing reasons why they are rejecting modern 
lines of authority in favor of seemingly obsolete ones.140 
The Privy Council articulated a similar disdain for foreign 
jurisprudence in hearing an appeal from Singapore in 1980.  In Ong Ah 
Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,141 their Lordships were called upon to consider 
whether the presumption of innocence is a fundamental human right 
protected by Article 9(1) of the Constitution, which states that “[n]o person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with 
law,”142 and Article 12(1).  They prefaced their discussion of the issue with 
the following statement: 
 
These articles are among eight articles in Pt IV of the 
Constitution under the heading “Fundamental Liberties.”  The 
eight articles are identical with similar provisions in the 
Constitution of Malaysia, but differ considerably in their 
language from and are much less compendious and detailed 
than those to be found in Pt III of the Constitution of India 
under the heading “Fundamental Rights.”  They differ even 
more widely from those amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States of America which are often referred to as its Bill 
of Rights.  In view of these differences their Lordships are of 
the opinion that decisions of Indian courts on Pt III of the 
Indian Constitution should be approached with caution as 
guides to the interpretation of individual articles in Pt IV of the 
Singapore Constitution; and that decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States on that country’s Bill of Rights, 
whose phraseology is now nearly 200 years old, are of little 
help in construing provisions of the Constitution of Singapore 
                                                   
137  See Choudhry, supra note 92, at 836; Ramraj, supra note 92, at 313-17. 
138  Choudhry, supra note 92, at 892. 
139 Ramraj, supra note 92, at 315-16. 
140  See Lee, supra note 92, at 131-32. 
141  Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 (PC) (appeal taken from Sing.). 
142 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 9(1). 
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or other modern Commonwealth constitutions which follow 
broadly the Westminster model.143 
 
Regrettably, the court did not mention the Indian and U.S. decisions 
that might have had a bearing on the issue, and thus did not explain why 
they were thought to be unhelpful.  This approach was abandoned by the 
Privy Council 200 decision in Reyes v. The Queen,144 with their Lordships 
holding that “limited assistance” was to be gained from Ong Ah Chuan and 
another case because the decisions had been “made at a time when 
international jurisprudence on human rights was rudimentary and the Board 
found little assistance in such authority as there was.”145 
The approach taken in Ong Ah Chuan and Jeyaretnam of disdaining 
certain lines of foreign jurisprudence was applied again in Chan Hiang Leng 
Colin v. Public Prosecutor.146  The issue facing the High Court was whether 
administrative orders issued by the Government to deregister the Singapore 
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and ban works by publishing 
companies associated with the Jehovah’s Witnesses violated the right to 
freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 15(1) of the Singapore 
Constitution.147  To justify not referring to U.S. First Amendment cases 
when interpreting Article 15(1), Chief Justice Yong quoted the following 
sentence from a 1963 decision of the High Court of Malaya, Government of 
the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya:148 “[T]he 
Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls and not 
in the light of analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, 
the United States of America or Australia.”149  Scholars have called this 
approach the ‘four walls’ theory or the doctrine of constitutional 
adjudication.150  The Chief Justice recognized that the First Amendment 
                                                   
143 Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 at [22] (PC) (appeal taken from 
Sing.). 
144 Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize). 
145 Id. at 257; see also Watson v. The Queen, [2005] 1 A.C. 472, 489 (appeal taken from Jam.). 
146 See generally Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 (HC) (Sing.).  
147 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 15(1) (“Every person 
has the right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate it.”). 
148 Government of the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya [1963] M.L.J. 
355, 358 (H.C.) (Malay.). 
149 Id. at 231. 
150 See Thiruvengadam, supra note 117, at 121; Thio Li-ann, The Secular Trumps the Sacred: 
Constitutional Issues Arising from Colin Chan v Public Prosecutor, 16 SING. L. REV. 26, 62 (1995); Thio 
Li-ann, Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and 
Tudungs, Women and Wrongs, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 328, 347 (2002); Victor V. Ramraj, 
Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 302, 302 (2002); Thio Li-ann, 
Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication: A Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s 
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contains both an ‘establishment clause,’ which prohibits Congress from 
enacting any law that tends to create a state religion, as well as a ‘free 
exercise clause,’ which restricts Congress from interfering with the free 
exercise of religion.  Curiously, though, he was satisfied that U.S. cases were 
inapplicable to Singapore because “the Singapore Constitution does not 
prohibit the ‘establishment’ of any religion.”151  However, this was beside 
the point because U.S. precedent interpreting the free exercise clause may 
have been relevant to Article 15(1), which is directed towards a similar 
end.152 
Chief Justice Yong also declined to refer to U.S. cases on the ground 
that “[t]he social conditions in Singapore are, of course, markedly different 
from those in the United States.”153  He said: “On this basis alone, I am not 
influenced by the various views as enunciated in the American cases cited to 
me but instead must restrict my analysis of the issues here with reference to 
the local context.” 154   Unfortunately, he did not articulate what these 
markedly different social conditions were, making it hard to assess whether 
U.S. cases are indeed inapplicable to Singapore.155 
The Kelantan case, which was quoted in Chan Hiang Leng Colin, 
relied on the Privy Council’s judgment in Adegbenro v. Akintola156 to 
support the ‘four walls’ proposition.  However, a careful reading of 
Adegbenro shows that the case merely indicates that foreign legal principles 
should not be applied if they cannot be accommodated by the local 
constitutional text.157  Their Lordships pointed out that “it may well be 
useful on occasions to draw on British practice or doctrine in interpreting a 
doubtful phrase whose origin can be traced or to study decisions on the 
Constitutions of Australia or the United States where federal issues are 
involved”—thus not entirely ruling out the use of foreign precedents.  
However, it must be borne in mind that “it is in the end the wording of the 
Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can 
never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions 
                                                                                                                                                       
Engagement with International Human Rights Law, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 59 (2004); Li-ann Thio, 
supra note 136, at 472-74; Lee, supra note 92, at 124-33. 
151 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [53]. 
152 See Thio Li-ann, The Secular Trumps the Sacred, supra note 150, at 66-68. 
153 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [53]. 
154 Id. 
155 Li-ann Thio, An ‘i’ for an ‘I’? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 
27 H.K.L.J. 152, 176 (“This perfunctory [waving] away of foreign cases on the basis of ‘we’re different’ is 
undesirable.  A focused elaboration of the different social conditions of these countries would aid in 
assessing their relevance to the matter at hand.”). 
156 Adegbenro v. Akintola, [1963] A.C. 614 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nigeria). 
157 Lee, supra note 92, at 124-25. 
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which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have been chosen 
as the frame of this Constitution.”158 
Indeed, the reluctance of the High Court in Chan Hiang Leng Colin to 
refer to certain foreign precedents did not mean that it did not cite any.  For 
instance, in support of its view that the administrative orders did not violate 
the Constitution, the Court cited an Australian decision, Adelaide Company 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. The Commonwealth,159 and an Indian one, 
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra 
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.160  The Australian decision was relied 
upon as an example of a court upholding the lawfulness of a government 
declaration that a corporation of Jehovah’s Witnesses was “prejudicial to the 
defense of the Commonwealth and the efficient prosecution of war,” and the 
consequential seizure of its premises.  The Australian court upheld the 
government declaration even though section 116 of the Australian 
Constitution protected the members’ right to free exercise of their religion 
from incursion by the federal government.161  Unfortunately, the Singapore 
High Court did not explain why a judgment rendered in the midst of World 
War II should be applicable to peacetime Singapore.  The Swamiar decision 
was cited for Justice Bjan Jumar Mukherjea’s point that “the right of 
freedom of religion must be reconciled with ‘the right of the State to employ 
the sovereign power to ensure peace, security and orderly living without 
which constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a mockery.’”162  
Assistant Professor Arun Thiruvengadam has noted that this statement was 
cited out of context because Justice Bjan Jumar Mukherjea had been 
paraphrasing Chief Justice John Latham in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.  In that case, Chief Justice John Latham had gone on to contrast it 
with the more liberal approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in West 
Virginia v. Barnette,163 which he ultimately preferred and adopted.164  Again, 
it might be said that the High Court made dialogical use of these foreign 
precedents, but if so, it did not provide sufficient justifications. 
The four walls doctrine went on to be cited in three 1998 judgments—
Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor, 165  Peter Williams Nappalli v. 
                                                   
158 Adegbenro v. Akintola, [1963] A.C. 614 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nigeria). 
159 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. The Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 
(Austl.). 
160 Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India). 
161 Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [61].  
162 Id. at [64]. 
163 West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
164 Thiruvengadam, supra note 117, at 149-51. 
165 Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at [78] (Sing.). 
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Institute of Technical Education,166 and the appeal from the latter case, 
which was reported as Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical 
Education.167  The doctrine last appeared in Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for 
Home Affairs in December 2005.168  Despite courts’ reliance on the four 
walls doctrine, foreign precedents continued to be cited as demonstrated by 
the Nappalli cases.  This suggests that the courts’ choice of which precedent 
to apply was not driven by a desire to engage in a transjudicial dialogue, but 
largely by the courts’ perceived need to constrain their own power in order 
to maintain a deferential stance towards the executive and legislature.169 
 
c. 2006–Present: Chief Justices Chan Sek Keong and Sundaresh Menon 
 
Singapore’s third Chief Justice, Chan Sek Keong (“Chan C.J.”), took 
office in 2006.  During his term and the term of his successor, Sundaresh 
Menon, the number of foreign precedents referred to in the cases surveyed 
rose. This suggests that judges’ ethos towards the use of such precedents in 
constitutional adjudication changed.  What led to this change is hard to 
discern.  As mentioned above, from 1991 onward, the Cabinet conferred a 
veto power over judicial nominations to the President.  However, since 1991, 
no President has exercised the veto.  This means that the Cabinet had a free 
hand in nominating judicial candidates that share its mindset on governance. 
Accordingly, the change in attitude regarding the usage of foreign 
precendents may simply reflect a change in the temperaments of the 
individual judges. 
This change is illustrated by comparing the 2006 High Court 
judgment in Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party,170 and the 
2010 Court of Appeal judgment in Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien 
Loong.171  In both decisions, the plaintiffs were Lee Hsien Loong, the 
current Prime Minister of Singapore, and his father Lee Kuan Yew, the 
former Prime Minister of Singapore, respectively.  They sued for defamation. 
In response, the defendants argued, among other things, that Article 14(1)(a) 
of the Constitution required the courts to modify the defense of qualified 
                                                   
166 Peter Williams Nappalli v. Institute of Technical Education [1998] SGHC 351 at [40-41] (HC) 
(Sing.). 
167 Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education [1998] 2 SLR(R) 529 at [19] (CA) 
(Sing.). 
168 Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at [132] (HC) (Sing.). 
169 The Singapore courts’ tendency to do so has been noted by, among others, Yvonne Tew, 
Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780, 825-29 (2014). 
170 Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party [2007] 1 SLR 675 (HC) (Sing.).  
171 Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 (CA) (Sing.).  
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privilege along the lines of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, a United 
Kingdom decision.172  In that case, the House of Lords held that publishers 
have a good defense to libel if they have practiced “responsible 
journalism.”173  In Lee Hsien Loong, the High Court held that the House of 
Lords in Reynolds modified the common law of defamation in light of 
Article 10 of the European Convention, which was to have binding effect in 
the United Kingdom when the Human Rights Act 1998174 came into force.  
Thus, the Court held that since the phrasing of Article 10 of the Human 
Rights Act differed from that of Article 14 of Singapore’s Constitution, 
Reynolds should not be followed.175   The High Court essentially adopted the 
approach taken in Jeyaretnam, which was binding on it.   
The Court also considered the Australian decision Lange v. Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 176  and the New Zealand decision Lange v. 
Atkinson,177 both of which held that a defense of privilege to defamation 
applies to statements containing information on political and government 
matters.178  However, the Court declined to adopt this principle because both 
decisions were “decisions born of the constitutional, political and social 
contexts in Australia and New Zealand.”179  Without providing details as to 
why these contexts were different in Singapore, the Court reiterated the 
stand taken in Jeyaretnam that the reputations of public figures should be 
protected to the same extent as those of ordinary people.180 
In Review Publishing, the Court of Appeal departed from cases like 
Chan Hiang Leng Colin and Lee Hsien Loong, where assertions that 
conditions in Singapore are different from those in other countries were 
made but not fully justified.  Chan C.J., who penned the Court’s opinion, 
stated that the defendants were not entitled to rely on Article 14 because they 
were not Singaporean citizens.181  Nonetheless, he proceeded to discuss on 
an obiter basis whether citizens could rely on the Reynolds defense.  He did 
not provide a definitive answer, but said that the courts would need to make 
                                                   
172 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
173 This is assessed by considering a non-exhaustive list of factors such as whether the subject matter 
is of public concern, whether steps have been taken to verify information, and whether it was necessary to 
publish the information urgently.  Id. at 205; see also Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 
1 SLR 52 at [192] (CA) (Sing.). 
174 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
175 Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party [2007] 1 SLR 675 at [75-76] (HC) (Sing.). 
176 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (Austl.). 
177 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA) (N.Z.). 
178 Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party [2007] 1 SLR 675 at [77-80] (HC) (Sing.). 
179 Id. at [81]. 
180 Id. 
181 For the exact wording of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 
Reprint) Art 14(1)(a), see supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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a value judgment when striking a balance between freedom of expression 
and the protection of reputation, and this would depend on “local political 
and social conditions.”182  His Honor then examined some considerations 
bearing upon these local conditions, including the fact that “there is no room 
in our political context for the media to engage in investigative journalism 
which carries with it a political agenda,” and that “[o]ur local political 
culture places a heavy emphasis on honesty and integrity in public discourse 
on matters of public interest, especially those matters which concern the 
governance of this country.” 183   Chan C.J.’s discussion of these 
considerations may be critiqued on the ground that it relied too heavily on 
past court cases and statements by government ministers, and did not 
account for the views of civil society groups and opposition politicians. 
Even so, the endeavor to provide principled reasons distinguishes this case 
from earlier ones.  Chan C.J. concluded by commenting that if the courts did 
find that citizens were entitled to avail themselves of the Reynolds defense, it 
would be necessary to consider how the “new balance” between free speech 
and protection of reputation should be struck, and, “[i]n this regard, it 
would . . . be helpful for our courts to bear in mind the different approaches 
which other common law jurisdictions have taken in order to give freedom 
of speech precedence over protection of reputation.”184 
In the 2008 judgment of Tan Chor Jin v. Public Prosecutor,185 the 
Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant, who had been convicted 
by the High Court of shooting and killing a man, had been deprived of his 
right to counsel because the trial judge had denied him permission to speak 
with a lawyer just before closing submissions were to be made.  Prior to the 
start of the trial, and again on the first day of the hearing, the appellant  
confirmed that he wished to represent himself.  The Court embarked on an 
extensive review of cases from Canada, Malaysia, and the United States, as 
well as Privy Council judgments on appeal from Jamaica.186  The Court 
eventually concluded that the common thread in these cases was the need to 
ensure fairness to the accused.187  It declined “[f]or now” to adopt the U.S. 
approach of laying down a detailed test as to when someone might waive his 
or her right to counsel, instead holding that courts should consider whether 
                                                   
182 Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [271] (CA) (Sing.) (citing 
Lange v. Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257, 261 (P.C.). 
183 Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [272] (CA) (Sing.); see also id. 
at [273-85].  
184 Id. at [286]. 
185 Tan Chor Jin v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 306 (CA) (Sing.). 
186 Id. at [56-67]. 
187 Id. 
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the lack of legal representation led to unfairness or prejudice to the 
accused.188  It then found that, on the facts, the appellant had not been 
prejudiced. 
References to foreign precedents also proved helpful in the Court of 
Appeal judgments Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General189 and Ramalingam 
Ravinthran v. Attorney-General,190 delivered in 2011 and 2012, respectively, 
by Chan C.J. and Judges of Appeal Andrew Phang and V.K. Rajah.  In Yong 
Vui Kong v. A.G., the issue was the justiciability of the power to grant 
clemency, which is conferred on the President by Article 22P of the 
Constitution and exercisable upon the Cabinet’s advice.  In a separate 
opinion, Chan C.J. examined cases from Australia, Canada, the Caribbean 
States, England, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, and New Zealand.  He 
preferred the line of authorities indicating that the clemency power is subject 
to judicial review if it is alleged to have been exercised in bad faith or 
unconstitutionally.191  In Ramalingam, Chan C.J. held that the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is judicially reviewable on the same grounds.  In the 
course of his judgment on behalf of the Court, he referred to a Privy Council 
decision on appeal from Malaysia,192 as well as decisions of U.S. federal 
courts, to support the conclusion that a presumption of constitutionality or 
legality applies to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.193 
One common feature of Tan Chor Jin, Yong Vui Kong v. A.G., and 
Ramalingam is that the relevant provisions of the Constitution requiring 
interpretation were not that different from analogous provisions in foreign 
jurisdictions.  For instance, the constitutional issue in Tan Chor Jin related 
to Article 9(3), the relevant parts of which state: “Where a person is arrested, 
he . . . shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of 
his choice.”194  The Court of Appeal looked at cases from Malaysia, Canada, 
and Jamaica, among other jurisdictions.  Article 5(3) of the Malaysian 
Constitution is identical to Singapore’s Article 9(3), since the latter was 
imported from the former.195  Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter states: 
“Everyone has the right on arrest or detention . . . to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay and to be informed of that right,”196 while section 
                                                   
188 Id. at [68]. 
189 Yong Vui Kong v. A.G. [2011] 2 SLR 1189 (CA) (Sing.).  
190 Ramalingam Ravinthran v. Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 (CA) (Sing.). 
191 Id. at [37-85]. 
192 Id. at [21-29]. 
193 Id. at [49-50]. 
194 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 9(3). 
195 Republic of Singapore Independence Act (Act 9 of 1965) s 6(1). 
196 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B 
to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 10(b) (U.K.). 
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20(6)(c) of the Constitution of Jamaica 1962 provides: “Every person who is 
charged with a criminal offence . . . shall be permitted to defend himself in 
person or by a legal representative of his own choice.”197  Thus, similarities 
between constitutional provisions in Singapore and in other jurisdictions 
likely gave the Court of Appeal confidence to apply precedents from these 
jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, the courts remain cautious about applying foreign 
precedents decided on the basis of differently worded bills of rights.  In 
Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor,198 a 2010 decision by Chan C.J. and 
Judges of Appeal Phang and Rajah, the Court of Appeal considered 
judgments of the Privy Council primarily from the Caribbean States, as well 
as judgments from India, Malawi, Uganda, and the United States. 199  
However, it found these judgments inapplicable in determining whether 
Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution prohibits inhuman punishment, as 
all except the Indian judgment were based on bills of rights that contain 
specific prohibitions against inhuman punishment, whereas Article 9(1) does 
not.200  The Court took the view that Article 9(1) could not be read to contain 
such a prohibition by implication.  It held this because, while a 1966 
constitutional commission proposed that a specific proscription against 
torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment be inserted into 
the Constitution, this suggestion, though accepted in principle by the 
Government, was ultimately not acted upon.201  As for the Indian case, 
Mithu v. State of Punjab,202 the Court of Appeal declined to follow it on 
three grounds despite the fact that the Indian Constitution, like the Singapore 
one, does not expressly outlaw inhuman punishment.  First, the Supreme 
Court of India applied a test of fairness, justice, and reasonableness, which 
the Singapore Court found too vague, and which “requires the court to 
intrude into the legislative sphere of Parliament as well as engage in policy 
making.”203  Secondly, the decision implied that all legislatively prescribed 
mandatory sentences and all fixed minimum and maximum sentences are 
                                                   
197 Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962, § 20(6)(c) (U.K.).  
198 Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SLR 489 (CA) (Sing.) [hereinafter Yong Vui Kong v. 
P.P.]. 
199 Id. at [34]. 
200 Id. at [50]. 
201 Id. at [64-74].  The author has suggested that since the documentary record is equivocal as to why 
Parliament decided against incorporating the prohibition into the Constitution, this should not have 
prevented the Court of Appeal from taking a generous approach and inferring it into Article 9(1).  See Jack 
Tsen-Ta Lee, The Mandatory Death Penalty and a Sparsely Worded Constitution, 127 L. Q. REV. 192, 193 
(2011). 
202 Mithu v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 473 (India). 
203 Yong Vui Kong v. P.P. [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [79-80] (CA) (Sing.). 
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unconstitutional; although that “may be . . . the law in India . . . . it is not the 
law in Singapore.”204  Finally, the Court held that “[t]he decision in Mithu is 
entirely understandable, having regard to the economic, social and political 
conditions prevailing in India and the pro-active approach of the Indian 
Supreme Court in matters relating to the social and economic conditions of 
the people of India,”205 thus suggesting that different conditions existed in 
Singapore, and that the courts should not adopt an activist stance when 
interpreting the Constitution. 
 
II. ANALSYSIS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
The selected Supreme Court judgments above highlight the fact that 
Singapore courts have consistently referred to foreign precedents in 
constitutional adjudication over the past half-century.  This was true even 
during the period roughly corresponding with Chief Justice Yong Pung 
How’s term of office (1990–2006), when the four walls doctrine held sway, 
although there was a fall in the number of such precedents cited.  The last 
explicit mention of the doctrine was in 2005; since then, “it appears that the 
‘four walls’ doctrine has quietly fallen out of fashion at least in practice, as 
courts now regularly consider foreign cases which have only persuasive, not 
precedential value . . . . It is fair to say that the development of Singapore 
public law is not accomplished in a cloister sealed off from transnational 
models, but through a thoughtful engagement with foreign cases.”206 
However, the mere references to foreign precedents do not mean that 
the courts have consistently engaged in a transjudicial dialogue with their 
counterparts abroad.  Rather, it appears that judges have been willing to 
apply foreign precedents only where the wording of the Constitution and the 
constitutional arrangements in Singapore are fairly analogous to the 
constitutional texts and arrangements upon which the precedents were 
decided.  Judgments illustrating this include Kok Hoong Tan Dennis, 
Sivadas, Chng Suan Tze, Tan Chor Jin, Yong Vui Kong v. A.G., and 
Ramalingam.  Some cases such as Jeyaretnam and Chan Hiang Leng Colin 
also demonstrate the courts’ tendency to approvingly quote passages from 
foreign cases to support statements of law without necessarily analyzing in 
detail the reasoning underlying such cases.  What judges have not been 
                                                   
204 Id. at [81-82]. 
205 Id. at [83]. 
206 Thio Li-ann, The Judiciary, in A TREATISE ON SINGAPORE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451, 566 (2012); 
see also Thio Li-ann & David Chong Gek Sian, The Chan Court and Constitutional Adjudication—‘A Sea 
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willing to do, however, is to use comparative constitutional material as a 
springboard to develop Singapore’s constitutional law in a manner 
incongruent with what they perceive to be the court’s role in judicial 
review.207 
Arun Thiruvengadam has theorized that Singaporean judges tend 
strongly towards the National Formalism rather than the Cosmopolitan 
Pragmatism model of constitutionalism.208  National Formalist judges are 
skeptical about the applicability of foreign precedents because they see the 
constitution as “deeply rooted in its particular history and political traditions,” 
and are more deferential to the policy choices of the executive and 
legislature.209  In contrast, Cosmopolitan Pragmatist judges see constitutions 
as “normative attempts to embody notions of fundamental justice,” and 
regard it as their responsibility to keep the constitution in line with modern 
societal values.  They view foreign precedents favorably because they regard 
certain constitutional norms as transcending jurisdictional boundaries, and 
thus it is useful to see what solutions foreign courts have developed to deal 
with common problems.210 
Some of the cases examined in the previous section bear out this 
analysis.  Jeyaretnam, Lee Hsien Loong, and Yong Vui Kong v. P.P. are 
examples of judgments in which the courts adopted quite literal readings of 
constitutional provisions.  It will be recalled that in Jeyaretnam, the High 
Court held that since Article 14(2)(a) does not require restrictions on 
freedom of speech to be “necessary in a democratic society,” Parliament is 
free to impose whatever restrictions it sees fit.211  Therefore, cases based on 
Article 10 of the European Convention,212 which does contain the phrase 
quoted above, are inapplicable in Singapore.  Similarly, in Yong Vui Kong v. 
P.P., the Court found foreign precedents based on bills of rights that contain 
                                                   
207 “Singapore’s constitutional jurisprudence is heavily formalistic; judges are generally reluctant to 
recognize implied constitutional rights or constitutional evolution.”  Tew, supra note 169, at 827. 
208 Thiruvengadam, supra note 117, at 133. 
209 Id. at 125.  See also Li-ann Thio, Beyond the ‘Four Walls’, supra note 136, at 517-18 (“In 
Singapore, the predominant judicial strain appears to be oriented towards deferentialism to state 
authorities . . . . Where transnational sources are engaged with strategically, as opposed to peremptorily 
dismissed, these are often either used to demonstrate a lack of international consensus over the scope and 
content of a right or as cultural ‘anti-models’ in service of the articulation of a ‘local conditions’ 
jurisprudence that prioritizes statist or communal interests over individual rights.”). 
210 Li-ann Thio, Beyond the ‘Four Walls’, supra note 136, at 128-29; see also Lee, supra note 92, at 
138-42. 
211 See Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 14(2)(a); 
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 (CA) (Sing.). 
212 See European Convention, supra note 130. 
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an express prohibition against inhuman punishment irrelevant when 
interpreting Article 9(1) of the Constitution.213 
The high degree of deference shown by the Singapore courts to the 
political branches of government is borne out by other cases indicating that 
legislation and executive acts must be presumed constitutional, and that the 
burden of establishing otherwise lies on the applicants making such 
claims.214  Furthermore, the courts have demonstrated a reluctance to apply 
legal rules requiring them to assess the reasonableness of legislative or 
executive policy.  We have already seen the Court of Appeal’s refusal in 
Yong Vui Kong v. P.P. to adopt a test of “fairness, justice and reasonableness” 
to Article 9(1) of the Constitution on the ground that it is too vague and 
would intrude into the legislative sphere—one of the reasons why it did not 
apply a decision of the Indian Supreme Court.215  Reference may also be 
made to the High Court’s obiter opinion in Chee Siok Chin that a 
proportionality analysis should not be applied when determining if executive 
action had infringed the applicant’s rights.  The Court said this was because 
proportionality is a European legal concept imported into U.K. law due to 
the latter’s treaty obligations, and because it “requires, in some cases, the 
court to substitute its own judgment for that of the proper authority. 
Needless to say, the notion of proportionality has never been part of the 
common law in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a legislative 
and/or an administrative power or discretion.  Nor has it ever been part of 
Singapore law.”216 
As Singaporean society matures and people become more accustomed 
to speaking in terms of rights and are willing to vindicate them through the 
courts, the number of constitutional cases heard by the courts each year is 
likely to increase, with a corresponding growth in the citation of foreign 
precedents.  It is harder, though, to predict whether the scope of transjudicial 
dialogue will broaden, or whether the courts will continue to demonstrate 
                                                   
213 A highly literalist approach was also taken by the High Court in Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public 
Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 at [18-19] (Sing.).  See also Thiruvengadam, supra note 117, at 141-44. 
214 Regarding legislation, see for instance Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 
489 at [60] (CA) (Sing.) (applied in Johari bin Kanadi v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 422 at [10] 
(Sing.), and Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR. 118 at [103] (HC) (Sing.)).  Regarding 
executive acts, see Ramalingam Ravinthran v. Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [43-44] (CA) (Sing.). 
215 See also Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 at [21] (Sing.) (“The 
Judiciary is in no position to determine if a particular piece of legislation is fair or reasonable as what is fair 
or reasonable is very subjective.  If anybody has the right to decide, it is the people of Singapore.”). 
216 Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at [87] (HC) (Sing.); see also 
Thiruvengadam, supra note 117, at 136-38. 
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what Thio Li-ann and David Chong have called “particularism without 
parochialism.”217 
The signs are mixed.  On the one hand, the courts have continued to 
adopt a deferential posture towards the executive and legislature.  In a 
remarkably philosophical judgment rendered in 2013, entitled Jeyaretnam 
Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General,218 the Court of Appeal expressed a 
preference for a ‘green-light’ view of public law. It said: 
The recognition that members of the public do not have the 
right per se to call upon the courts to review every decision 
made by public bodies is not only undergirded by the obvious 
pragmatism of minimizing disruptiveness caused by vexatious 
claims to the functioning of those bodies, but also exists as a 
reflection of the very ethos of our adversarial system . . . . [T]he 
courts [are] concerned only with the individual’s rights and 
interests, and not matters of public policy, which rightfully 
remains in the remit of proper political process.  In this vein, 
judicial review finds its place as an avenue for parties to bring 
claims of legality to the courts, and not for the purposes of 
challenging the very merits of a policy decision.  Extensive 
judicial intervention in the administrative process is by no 
means the only avenue by which good governance can be 
ensured.  Some regulatory functions can be better performed by 
other institutions or organs of state.219 
Accordingly, the Court held that the applicant lacked standing to bring 
judicial review proceedings against the Government for offering a 
contingent loan of US $4 billion to the International Monetary Fund without 
the President’s concurrence, which the applicant alleged to be a breach of 
the Constitution.220  The applicant could not show that the executive act had 
breached any private right which he enjoyed, or breached a public right 
which had led to him suffering special damage.221 
On the other hand, the Court indicated that where “extremely 
exceptional instances of very grave and serious breaches of legality” 
appeared to have taken place, “such that it would be in the public interest for 
the courts to hear the case, an applicant sans rights may be accorded locus 
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standi as well, at the discretion of the courts.”222  Similarly, in Yong Vui 
Kong v. P.P.,223 the Court of Appeal shed its diffidence towards implying 
into the constitutional text principles that were not explicitly set out.  It held 
on an obiter basis that legislation intended to usurp the courts’ role by 
securing the conviction of particular known individuals, and “legislation of 
so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not possibly have been 
contemplated by our constitutional framers as being ‘law’ when they crafted 
the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental liberties,” might not 
qualify as ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the Constitution.224 
Ultimately, while there is little doubt that the Singapore courts will 
continue to cite foreign precedents when interpreting the Constitution, the 
choice of which precedents to follow or reject will depend on whether they 
remain largely deferential to the policy choices of the political branches, or 
instead develop constitutional principles to subject these choices to greater 
scrutiny.  It will be interesting to see which direction Chief Justice 
Sundaresh Menon, who assumed office in 2012, will steer the courts. 
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